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Abstract
We study the existence of equilibrium when agents’ preferences may not be
convex. For some specific utility functions, we provide a necessary and sufficient
condition under which there exists an equilibrium. The standard approach can-
not be directly applied to our examples because the demand correspondence of
some agents is neither single valued nor convex valued.
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1 Introduction
The existence of equilibrium is one of the fundamental issues in economic theory. A
simple version of the existence theorem can be stated as follows. Consider a pure
exchange economy where there are m agents, L goods, and the consumption set of
each agent is RL+. If the utility function of each agent is continuous, strictly con-
cave, strongly monotone, and the aggregate endowment of each good is strictly pos-
itive, then there exists a general equilibrium, i.e., a list of prices and allocations
(p1, . . . , pL, (c̄i,1, . . . , c̄i,L)
m
i=1) ∈ RL++ × RmL+ such that
1. For (p1, . . . , pL) given, and for any agent i = 1, . . . ,m, the allocation (c̄i,1, . . . , c̄i,L)
is a solution of the agent i’s maximization problem:









ui(ci,1, . . . , ci,L) (1)
where ui is the utility function and (ei,1, . . . , ei,L) is the endowment of agent i.
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i=1 ei,l∀l = 1, . . . , L (market clearing condition).
Debreu (1982) and Florenzano (2003) offer excellent treatments of the existence
of equilibrium, where they prove the existence of equilibrium in more much general
frameworks (preferences of agents are considered instead of utility functions, produc-
tions may be introduced, the number of commodities and agents may be infinite,...).1
When proving the existence of general equilibrium, the standard approach requires
the convexity of the preferences (or the (quasi)concavity of the utility function). The
existence of equilibrium with non-convex preferences is an important issue but remains
an open question. Although Aumann (1966) proves the existence of general equilib-
rium in an exchange economy consisting of a continuum of agents with non-convex
preferences,2 he also recognizes that such a result is not true when there are finitely
many agents. Recently, Araujo et al. (2018) study the equilibrium existence in a model
with two kinds of agents: one with strictly concave utility function and another with
strictly convex one. A key condition ensuring the existence of equilibrium in Araujo et
al. (2018) is that the aggregate endowment of convex-preference agents is sufficiently
large in some state of nature compared to the aggregate endowment in other states.
The main aim of our paper is to study the issue of the existence of equilibrium when
the agents’ utility functions are neither concave nor convex. In general cases where
preferences of some agents may not be convex, it would be interesting but difficult to
find a necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium existence. By consequence,
for the sake of tractability, we focus on a two-agent two-good exchange economy. The
type A agent (risk averse agent) has logarithmic utility function ln(c1)+ ln(c2) and the




+D ln(c2). The demand of agent A is single-valued
and continuous. However, the demand of the type B agent may be multiple-valued
because her utility function which is neither quasiconcave nor quasiconvex on the
consumption set R2+. By the way, the standard approach (see, for instance, Mas-Colell
et al. (1995) and references therein) cannot be directly applied to our example. Notice
also that the results in Araujo et al. (2018) cannot be applied in our model. The reason
is that agent B’s utility function is neither concave nor convex (and hence agent B’s
demand may not be on the boundary of the budget set) while the second agent’s utility
function in Araujo et al. (2018) is strictly convex (hence her optimal consumption is
on the boundary of their budget set).
Under our specifications, we manage to characterize all possible cases and find
out a necessary and sufficient condition under which equilibrium exists (Proposition
1). We can also explicitly compute the equilibrium outcomes. Our necessary and suffi-
cient condition allows us to understand how different parameters affect the equilibrium
existence.
1See Becker et al. (1991), Becker et al. (2015), Le Van and Pham (2016) for the existence of
intertemporal equilibrium in infinite-horizon economies with production and borrowing constraints.
See Magill and Quinzii (1996), Florenzano (1999), Geanakoplos and Zame (2002) for the existence
of equilibrium in a two-period stochastic economy with incomplete financial markets, and Araujo et
al. (2002), Magill and Quinzii (2008), Bosi et al. (2018b) and references therein for the existence of
equilibrium in infinite-horizon economies with collateral constraints and production.
2A key point in Aumann (1966) is that the aggregate preferred set is convex. He proves this by
using a mathematical result which states that the integral of any set-valued function over a non-atomic
measure space is convex (Aumann, 1965; Richter, 1963).
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1. Role of D. Given a distribution of endowments, when the agent B strongly
wants to consume good 2 (i.e., D is high enough), then there exists a unique
equilibrium. In this equilibrium, agent B does not consume good 1. Although
we have the uniqueness of equilibrium, the demand of agent B may be multiple-
valued.
By contrast, if agent B strongly wants to consume good 1 (D is low enough), then
there exists a unique equilibrium, and this equilibrium is interior. Interestingly,
there is a room for the non-existence of equilibrium. This happens for some range
of values of D.
2. Role of endowments. If we fix all parameters excepted the endowments
(eA1 , e
A
2 ) of agent A (risk averse agent), then there exists an equilibrium if e
A
1
or eA2 is high enough (see Corollary 1). This result is consistent with the main
finding in Araujo et al. (2018). However, while the equilibrium in Araujo et al.
(2018) is a corner equilibrium, the equilibrium in our model may be interior or
corner, depending on the distribution of endowments and the preferences of the
agents.
More interestingly, we complement Araujo et al. (2018) by pointing out, via
examples, that: the equilibrium existence may fail even when the endowment of
the agent B whose utility is neither concave or convex is very high.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the structure of the economy
and the concept of general equilibrium. In Section 3, we study the existence and
properties of general equilibrium. Section 4 concludes. Technical proofs are presented
in Appendix A.
2 A two-agent, two-good exchange economy
We consider a two-agent, two-good exchange economy with a risk averse agent and an
agent who is neither risk loving nor risk averse.
2.1 Individual demand
Assume that there are two goods and the consumption set is R2+. We firstly compute
the demand of each agent.
Agent A (risk averse). Assume that the utility of this agent is UA(c1, c2) = ln(c1)+
ln(c2). This utility is strictly concave. Given prices p1, p2 and income w, the budget






2 = w/2. (2)





This agent is risk loving with good 1 but risk averse with good 2. Note that this
function is neither quasiconcave nor quasiconvex on the consumption set R2+. With
this specification, we can explicitly compute the demand for each good.
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0 if w2 ≤ 4Dp21
















if w2 > 4Dp21 and V (w, p1) > D ln(w)
(3)
and cB2 = (w − p1cB1 )/p2, where















Proof. See Appendix A.
The demands of agent B deserve some comments.
First, notice that the three following conditions are not empty: (1) w2 > 4Dp21 and
V (w, p1) < D ln(w), (2) w2 > 4Dp21 and V (w, p1) = D ln(w), (3) w2 > 4Dp21 and
V (w, p1) > D ln(w).3 Hence, the demand correspondences are single valued everywhere
excepted when w2 > 4Dp21 and V (w, p1) = D ln(w). They are upper semi-continuous
(usc), compact valued but not convex valued.





+D ln(w − p1c1).
• The first case in (3) is related to the fact the the utility function for good 1
is not Inada at the origin. Indeed, consider another concave utility function
ŨB(c1, c2) = ln(1 + c1) +D ln(c2). One can check that: if w ≤ Dp1 then c̃B1 = 0.
When the real revenue, in term of good 1, w
p1
is smaller than the preference
parameter D for good 2 then agent B consumes only good 2. The function
ln(1 + c1) +D ln(w − p1c1) is strictly decreasing on [0, w/p1).
• The second case in (3): the function f is not decreasing but has two maxima in
[0, w/p1), one is located at 0. The maximum at 0 is higher than the one at the
interior point. When the real revenue w/p1 is still low compared to the preference
parameter D, agent B drops her risk loving behavior for good 1.
• The third case in (3): the two maxima equal. Agent B is indifferent between









• The fourth case in (3): the real revenue w/p1 is high enough to make agent B
becoming both risk loving for good 1 and risk averse for good 2.
Remark 1. Observe that good 2 is normal if w2 ≤ 4Dp21 (income is low). When














which is decreasing in w, but not Giffen.
3Indeed, if (p1 − w
2
√
D ) → 0− then w
2 > 4Dp21 and V (w, p1) < D ln(w). If p1 = w4√D , then











s.t. w2 > 4Dp21
and V (w, p1) = D ln(w).
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2.2 Concept of general equilibrium
Assume that agent A has endowments (eA1 , e
A
2 ) ≫ 0 and agent B has endowments
(eB1 , e
B
2 ) ≫ 0. The aggregate supply of good i is eAi + eBi for i = 1, 2. We provide a
standard definition of general equilibrium.








2 ) of non-negative numbers is a general equi-











U i(c1, c2) (4)






i for i = 1, 2.
We will investigate the existence of general equilibrium in our model. It should be
noticed that we cannot directly apply Proposition 17.C.1 of Mas-Colell et al. (1995) to
our example in order to prove the existence of general equilibrium because the demand
correspondences of agent B are double-valued when (wB)
2 > 4Dp21 and B(wB, p1) =
D ln(wB). Observe also that the aggregate demand correspondences are not convex
valued. So, the method in McKenzie (1959) cannot be applied as well.
3 Existence and properties of general equilibrium
In order to prove the existence and to compute equilibrium, we need to introduce some




















We can check that the function g is increasing in x.
Notice that x∗ > 2
√
D and x∗ only depends on D (so we write x∗ = x∗(D)).
Moreover, x∗(D) is an increasing function of D and it converges to 0 when D converges
to 0.






















X + (eB1 + e
A
1 )
2 + 4D − (eB1 )2.
























4D − (eB1 )2
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and F ′(X∗) = 0.




2 are strictly positive while c
B
1 may
be zero or strictly positive at equilibrium. The following results provide necessary
conditions for the equilibrium existence.
Lemma 2. Assume that there exists an equilibrium. Then there are two cases:
1. Agent B does not consume good 1 (cB1 = 0). In this case, the relative price must
be p2
p1
















2. Agent B consumes good 1 (cB1 > 0). In this case, the equilibrium relative price





int ≥ x∗(D) (10)
Proof. See Appendix A.
We can now state the main result of the section.
Proposition 1 (existence and computation of equilibrium). Let us consider the ex-
change economy with two agents described at the beginning of this section.








2 ) with c
B
1 = 0 if and only if con-
dition (9) holds. Such an equilibrium is unique, up to a positive scalar for the
prices. The equilibrium relative price p2/p1 = π
cor.








2 ) with c
B
1 > 0 if and only if con-
dition (10) holds. Such an equilibrium is unique, up to a positive scalar for the
prices. The equilibrium relative price p2/p1 = π












3. There is no equilibrium if and only if eB1 + e
B
2 π
cor > x∗(D) > eB1 + eB2 πint.




x∗(D) means that the income in terms of good 1, when the relative price p2/p1 is πcor,
is low with respect to x∗(D). Condition (10), i.e., eB1 + eB2 πint ≥ x∗(D) means that
the income in terms of good 1 of agent B, when the relative price p2/p1 is π
int, is high
with respect to x∗(D)
Since x∗(D) is an increasing function of D, condition (9) (resp., (10)) is satisfied
if, and only if, D is high enough (resp., low enough). The intuition is that when D is
6
Figure 1: Edgeworth box with the unique corner equilibrium. LHS: the unique
equilibrium. RHS: the unique equilibrium but the demand for good 1 of agent B is
double-valued. The blue (resp., green) curve is the indifferent curve of agent A (resp.,
agent B) while the black line represents the equilibrium price.
Figure 2: Edgeworth box with the unique interior equilibrium. LHS: the unique
equilibrium, RHS: the unique equilibrium but the demand for good 1 of agent B is
double-valued.
high enough, agent B strongly wants to consume good 2. In this case, there exists an
equilibrium in which she does not buy good 1, i.e., cB1 = 0. By contrast, when D is
low enough but still strictly positive, agent B consumes good 1 at equilibrium.4
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the unique equilibrium by using the Edgeworth box.5
Although there is a unique equilibrium, the demand of agent B may be singleton or
double-valued (see the right hand side of both Figures 1 and 2).
4Notice that when D = 0 (agent B only wants to consume good 1), there is a unique equilibrium.










5We numerically draw our figures by using the website https://www.desmos.com/calculator.
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On the non-existence of equilibrium
Proposition 1 also provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-existence
of equilibrium: eB1 + e
B
2 π
cor > x∗(D) > eB1 + eB2 πint (notice that this happens if D
has a middle level). The intuition is the following. If there exists an equilibrium,
the equilibrium relative price must be either πcor or πint. However, πcor cannot be an
equilibrium price because it is not optimal for agent B if he does not consume good
1. In Figure 3 (dashed curves), we observe that point C is not an equilibrium.6 We
also see that πint cannot be an equilibrium price. Indeed, continuous curves in Figure
3 indicates that point N is not an equilibrium.
Figure 3: Edgeworth box. There is no equilibrium
Role of agents’ endowments
Proposition 1 allows us to understand the roles of agents’ endowments on the existence
of equilibrium. We start with the following result.


















πcor = ∞. (12)
1. There exists an equilibrium for any eA2 high enough (because point 3 in Proposition
1 cannot happen when eA2 is high enough). More precisely, we have that:
6We draw Figure 3 with the following parameters: eA1 = e
A
2 = 1, e
B
1 = 0.8, e
B
2 = 1, D = 0.9.
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(a) If x∗(D) > eB1 , then when eA2 is very large, there exist a unique and cB1 = 0
at equilibrium.
(b) If x∗(D) ≤ eB1 , then when eA2 is very large, there exist a unique and cB1 > 0
at equilibrium.
2. When eA1 is high enough, there exist a unique equilibrium and c
B
1 > 0 at equilib-
rium.
We now show the role of endowments of agent B whose utility is neither concave
nor convex.
Corollary 2 (role of agent B’s endowments).
1. When eB1 is high enough, condition (10) holds. Thus, there exists a unique equi-
librium and cB1 > 0 at equilibrium.




















. So, when eB2 is high
























> x∗(D), then there exists a unique equilibrium and
cB1 > 0 at equilibrium.
According to Corollary 1, there exists an equilibrium if the endowment of good 1 or
good 2 of the risk-averse agent is high enough. This point is consistent with the main
finding in Araujo et al. (2018). Notice that Araujo et al. (2018) consider general utility
functions but that of type A agent is concave and that of type B agent is convex. They
prove that there exists an equilibrium when the endowment of risk averse agent eA2 or
eA1 is high enough. Corollary 1 is distinct from Araujo et al. (2018) in two ways. First,
although we work with specific preferences, the utility function of agent B is neither
concave nor convex. By consequence, the method of Araujo et al. (2018) cannot be
applied to our model. Second, in Araujo et al. (2018), the optimal allocation of the
type B agent in equilibrium is always in the corner (which corresponds to the case
cB1 = 0 in our model) because this agent’s utility is strictly convex. By contrast, in our
model, when the risk-aversion agent’s endowment is high enough, the equilibrium may
be interior. Indeed, this happens if (i) eA2 is high enough and x
∗(D) ≤ eB1 (see point
1.b of Corollary 1) or (ii) eA1 is high enough (see point 2 of Corollary 1).
More interestingly, point 2.a of Corollary 2 indicates that there may not exist an
equilibrium when the good 2 endowment of agent B (whose utility function is neither
concave nor convex) is very high, given that the remaining agent has concave utility
function. This point complements the main finding of Araujo et al. (2018).
Remark 2. We can prove that the equilibrium existence may fail even when (1) the
utility function of the remaining agent is convex and (2) the good 2 endowment of the
agent B is very high. Indeed, consider an economy consisting of agent B and agent D








(who utility function is UD(c1, c2) = c2 which is convex). As we prove in Appendix that,
there exists an equilibrium if and only if eB1 +e
D





there exists an equilibrium when the good 1 endowment cB1 of agent B is high enough
but the equilibrium may fail when the good 2 endowment cB2 of agent B is high enough.
This is consistent with Corollary 2.
4 Conclusion
We have provided some examples where we can explicitly characterize a necessary and
sufficient condition (based on fundamentals) for the (non-)existence of general equilib-
rium. Although the agent B’s utility function is neither quasiconcave nor quasiconvex,
there may exist a general equilibrium. We view our examples as part of the first
steps to investigate a challenging issue - the existence of equilibrium in models with
non-convex preferences.
A Appendix









+D ln(w − p1c1) (13)
in order to determine the demand for good 1 of agent A.




+D ln(w − p1c1). We have that




−p1c21 + c1w −Dp1
w − p1c1













We consider all possible cases.
(1) If w2 − 4Dp21 < 0 then f ′(c1) < 0, ∀c1 ≥ 0. Then the demand is c1 = 0.






≤ 0. Then the
demand is again c1 = 0.
(3) If w2−4Dp21 > 0, then we have 0 < x2 < x1 < w/p1. Moreover, we observe that







Observe that f(x1) − f(0) = V (w, p1) − Dln(w). From these properties, we can
obtain the demand as in Lemma 1.
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According to Lemma 1, we have either (1) (wB)
2 ≤ 4Dp21 or (2) (wB)2 > 4Dp21 and
V (wB, p1) ≤ D ln(wB), where wB = p1eB1 + p2eB2 . We consider two cases.
(1.a) (wB)


















2 > 4Dp21 and V (wB, p1) ≤ D ln(wB).

































Denote x ≡ wB
p1




















































D) = D(0.5 − ln(2)) < 0 and g(∞) = ∞. Hence, the equation
g(x) = 0 has a unique solution x∗ in the interval (2
√
D,∞). Notice that this solution
only depends on the parameter D.
The above computation leads to the following observations:
(wB)








V (wB, p1) ≤ D ln(wB) ⇔ g(eB1 + eB2
p2
p1











From this, we obtain (9).
Part 2: Let us consider an interior equilibrium. Since the good 1 consumption of





2 > 4Dp21 and V (wB, p1) ≥
D ln(wB).
The first step is to determine the relative price X ≡ p2/p1. To do so, we consider






































2 − 4D = (eB1 + eA1 − (eB2 + eA2 )X)2
(eB1 + e
A
1 )−X(eB2 + eA2 ) > 0
⇔
{
F (X) = 0
(eB1 + e
A
1 )−X(eB2 + eA2 ) > 0










conditions under which this happens. Firstly, we compute































2 − (eB2 )2
)
.
We observe that F (0) = (eB1 + e
A
1 )








) = ((eB2 + e
A
2 )















+ (eB1 + e
A
1 )









We consider all possible cases.





















< 0, the equation
F (X) has no solution, a contradiction.





















= 0, the equation











































































− 4D(eB2 + eA2 )2 ≤ 0, then the equation















































































). So, there is


































D > 0, (25)










is the smallest solution of the equation F (X) = 0.
We now look at the conditions. (wB)





2 is the income of agent B.
As in the proof of part 1, we have
(wB)





D ⇔ eB1 + eB2 πint > 2
√
D (26)
V (wB, p1) ≥ D ln(wB) ⇔ g(eB1 + eB2
p2
p1
) ≥ g(x∗(D)) ⇔ eB1 + eB2 πint ≥ x∗(D). (27)




Remark 3. Since x∗(D) > 2
√





Proof of Proposition 1. We mainly use Lemmas 1 and 2. Let us firstly prove point
1. The necessary condition follows point 1 of Lemma 2. Assume now that (9) is
satisfied. We will prove that there exists a unique equilibrium, the relative price is
p2
p1







and cB1 = 0. First, suppose that there is another equilibrium relative




Since πint < πcor, we get that eB1 + e
B
2 π
cor ≥ x∗(D), a contradiction. Therefore, we
obtain the uniqueness of equilibrium relative price.


















≤ x∗(D), we have that (cB1 , cB2 ) = (0, p1eB1 /p2 + eB2 )











) is the unique solution to agent A’s maximization problem.












which implies that cB1 = 0 is the unique good 1 consumption of agent B at equilibrium.
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We can prove point 2 by adopting a similar argument used in the proof of point 1.
Point 3 is a direct consequence of Lemma 2.








2 ). Since the utility
function of agent D is UD(cD1 , c
D
2 ) = c
D
2 , we have c
D
1 = 0, p2c
D
2 = wD ≡ p1eD1 + p2eD2 .
The good 1 market clearing condition implies that cB1 = e1 ≡ eB1 + eD1 > 0. Since the






and V (wB, p1) ≥ D ln(wB). Denote X ≡ p2/p1. Observe that
(wB)





D ⇔ eB1 + eB2 X > 2
√
D (29)
V (wB, p1) ≥ D ln(wB) ⇔ g(eB1 + eB2
p2
p1
) ≥ g(x∗(D)) ⇔ eB1 + eB2 X ≥ x∗(D). (30)
We now determine the relative price X ≡ p2/p1. To do so, we consider market


























2 − 4D = (eB1 + 2eD1 )− eB2 X (31c)
Since eB1 + e
B
2 X > 2
√





2 − 4D = ((eB1 + 2eD1 )− eB2 X)2
(eB1 + 2e
D
1 )− eB2 X > 0









< eB1 + 2e
D
1


















2 X ≥ x∗(D)
⇔
{










Conversely, we can easily check that under these conditions, there exists an equilibrium
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